The relationship between cocaine prices and crime has critical implications for U.S. 
I. INTRODUCTION
It is undeniable that cocaine use is related to crime. In 1997, the mean percentage of arrestees age 15 and above testing positive for cocaine in a sample of 23 large U.S. cities was 36.2 percent for males and 38.1 percent for females (National Institute of Justice [1998] ). In contrast, only 0.9 percent of males and 0.5 percent of females aged 12 and above reported past month cocaine use in the 1997 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (SAMHSA [1998] ). Opinion surveys and the academic literature indicate that it is this relationship to crime and the associated burden placed on the criminal justice system that has fueled both popular discontent regarding the cocaine situation and recent discussions in policy circles regarding the legalization of cocaine.
The pharmacological effects of cocaine, which Allen [1987] and Washton [1987] describe in detail, may cause criminal behavior. Intoxication from cocaine in either of its two most popular forms, powder and crack, increases aggression and sexual arousal and reduces self-control. 1 Lasting effects from chronic use include anxiety, irritability, insomnia, mood swings, confusion, irrationality and paranoia. If the link between cocaine use and crime is primarily a manifestation of pharmacological effects of cocaine intoxication, the arrestee figures provide an argument in favor of current U.S. cocaine enforcement policy. By arresting sellers and seizing their cocaine and other assets, enforcement policy attempts to raise the price of cocaine by imposing costs on the cocaine trade and ultimately restricting its supply. As long as the demand for cocaine, like most consumption goods, is negatively related to its price, then an increase in the price of cocaine deters its use and thereby lessens crime arising from cocaine intoxication.
The arrestee data do not necessarily establish a causal link from cocaine to crime.
Criminals may disproportionately use cocaine, or people who intend to commit crimes may prepare themselves by using cocaine. But even disregarding the possibility that the relationship is spurious, another potential pathway of causation exists that yields the opposite implication for the impact of drug enforcement on crime. Cocaine is expensive, with many cocaine addicts spending hundreds or even thousands of dollars a week to support their habits (Washton [1987] ). Legitimate earnings opportunities are scarce for many cocaine users (Kleiman [1992] ). Some users must therefore commit incomeproducing property crimes such as robbery, burglary and theft in order to finance the purchase of cocaine. An increase in the price of cocaine may accordingly increase expenditures on cocaine and therefore the amount of property crime necessary to afford it.
In addition, some violent crime arises simply because of the illegality of cocaine.
Participants in the cocaine market cannot rely on legal institutions for protection or dispute resolution. They therefore turn to violence for matters such as the punishment of those who steal, inform, or do not pay debts, and the settlement of disagreements over dealing territory or the price and quality of drugs. Goldstein [1985] refers to this as systemic violence. Though the majority of its victims are cocaine users or sellers, systemic violence can spill over to others not involved with the cocaine trade.
This breakdown of the pathway between cocaine and crime into three separate connections is a generalization on the part several researchers (Nadelmann [1988] ; Kleiman [1992] ; Miron [1992] ; Boyum and Kleiman [1994] ) of the well-known Goldstein [1985] tripartite conceptual framework for the relationship between drug use and violence. Legalization advocates such as Nadelmann [1988] , Friedman [1992] , and Miron [1992] argue that cocaine policy, not consumption, is responsible for cocainerelated crime. They focus on the latter two categories of cocaine-related crime discussed above. However, unless cocaine demand is highly price inelastic or cocaine intoxication does not cause crime, legalization would increase crime resulting from cocaine intoxication by substantially lowering the price of cocaine.
The response of crime to changes in cocaine prices, therefore, has extremely important implications for U.S. drug policy but is theoretically ambiguous. Empirical determination of the exact causal mechanisms that relate cocaine prices to crime is infeasible because the necessary data simply do not exist. However, available data do allow for the estimation of the reduced form effect of prices on crime. Since the price is the main variable that enforcement policy manipulates under the existing state of cocaine prohibition, knowledge of this reduced form relationship is sufficient to inform such policy. Moreover, since cocaine is not likely to be legalized in the near future, the current regime of prohibition is the relevant framework within which to analyze the crime effects of cocaine policy.
Using a time series of data from 30 large cities encompassing the 1981-1995 period, I estimate the relationship between cocaine prices and crime rates as part of a more general economic model of crime that also takes into account deterrence, socioeconomic determinants, prices of other drugs, and fixed effects for cities and years. I control for the potential simultaneity between the price and crime rates using two-stage least squares (2SLS) with measures of wholesale supply factors and retail enforcement intensity as instruments for the price. Specification tests show that the exclusion restrictions made to identify the price in the crime equations are empirically valid. The results indicate significant negative effects of cocaine prices on all but one of the seven index crime categories included in the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Exogeneity tests show that ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates are uniformly biased upward.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The following section describes the theoretical framework underlying the relationship between cocaine prices and crime in the context of the standard economic model of crime. Section III reviews the existing empirical research on the price elasticity of cocaine demand and on the relationship between cocaine and crime. After section IV outlines the estimation strategy, section V discusses the data and section VI reports and analyzes the empirical results. Section VII concludes with an assessment of the implications and limitations of the study.
II. THE COCAINE-CRIME RELATIONSHIP Benson et. al. [1992] and Chaloupka and Saffer [1992] consider the relationship between drug consumption and crime within the more general framework of the economic model of crime originally presented by Becker [1968] and Ehrlich [1973] . I alter their models slightly in order to include drug prices rather than consumption. In particular, I specify a reduced-form equation for the supply of offenses that relates crime to variables representing the expected costs and benefits of criminal behavior along with the price of cocaine, P, and a vector of prices of other drugs, D. This equation is written
where O is the number of offenses, A denotes the probability of arrest, and E and X represent vectors of economic and demographic variables, respectively, that are expected to affect crime.
The direction of the effect of P on O in equation (1) depends crucially on the price elasticity of cocaine demand. Consider in turn the three ways outlined in the introduction in which cocaine consumption affects crime. First, any crime that is caused by the pharmacological effect of cocaine intoxication is directly related to cocaine consumption, which is negatively related to its price by law of demand. The change in consumption induced by a price change increases as demand becomes more price elastic. The impact of a change in the price of cocaine on crime related to cocaine intoxication, therefore, increases with the magnitude of the price elasticity of cocaine demand.
Second, property crime is expected to increase as the price of cocaine increases, at least for price inelastic cocaine demand. Cocaine expenditures often make up a substantial part of the budget set for cocaine users. As the price increases, therefore, real income decreases, and users therefore need to either work or steal more to support their habits.
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As the price elasticity of demand increases in magnitude, the increase in expenditure on cocaine, and therefore the effect of the price on property crime, should decrease in magnitude. If demand is price elastic, cocaine expenditures actually decline with price increases, though it is uncertain whether this reduces property crime since real income has decreased. It is also possible that cocaine use reduces legal earnings, in which case users would have to increase illegal earnings to maintain a constant level of income. The effect of a price change on a cocaine-induced shift from legal to illegal 2 This assumes that the income effect dominates the substitution effect of a decrease in the relative price of leisure in the labor-leisure decision. If income does increase, then the change in cocaine demand resulting from a change in the price of cocaine will be less than the amount indicated by the price elasticity of demand, which holds income constant. By revealed preference, though, the change in cocaine demand will still be in the opposite direction as the price and will still increase in magnitude as the magnitude of the demand elasticity increases.
earnings increases with the change in cocaine consumption and thus with the price elasticity of demand. In sum, the relationship between the price of cocaine and property crime is expected to be positive for highly inelastic demand and either insignificant or negative for elastic demand.
Third, within an illegal regime, systemic violence is expected to rise with both cocaine consumption, which indicates the volume of sales activity in the market, and expenditure, since sellers compete for drug market revenues (Caulkins [1996] ). The price of cocaine has a causal effect on systemic violence if cocaine demand responds to price movements and the resulting changes in sales and revenue directly impact systemic violence. Again, the price elasticity of demand determines the direction of this relationship. A positive relationship through revenue changes is predicted for highly inelastic demand, while a negative relationship through changes in both consumption and revenue is predicted for elastic demand. Another possibility, however, is that market competition simultaneously drives down the price of cocaine and promotes conflict among drug sellers. As this produces a spurious negative relationship between the price and violent crime, the estimation procedure must account for this possibility in order to isolate the direct effect of the price on crime.
This discussion highlights the importance of the price elasticity of demand for cocaine in determining the direction of the relationship between cocaine prices and crime. For highly inelastic demand, price increases are expected to increase both systemic violence and property crime because expenditures on cocaine increase. For highly elastic demand, price increases are expected to reduce cocaine consumption and thereby violent crime arising from both cocaine intoxication and systemic effects, and to either reduce or have no impact on property crime.
III. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

A. Price Elasticity of Cocaine Demand
Both theory and empirical evidence contradict the conventional wisdom that because cocaine is addictive, cocaine demand is price inelastic. White and Luksetich [1983] note that the effect of an illegal drug price increase on property crime depends on whether drug demand is price elastic and thus on whether drug expenditure increases or decreases. As they point out, demand is necessarily price elastic if cocaine markets are effectively monopolized. Although search costs arising from risks of arrest and fraud give sellers some monopoly power, falling prices during the 1980s in part reflected competitive pressures from new entrants (Kleiman [1992] ; Rhodes et al. [1994] ). Evidence from National Institute of Justice (NIJ) [1997] and Riley [1997] suggests that local retail cocaine markets are highly competitive. 3 White and Luksetich [1983] argue that even if cocaine markets are not monopolized, an elasticity of demand of close to zero is untenable. As long as withdrawal pain does not increase discretely to an unbearable level upon a decrease in consumption, cocaine users can stretch out the time between doses in the face of price increases. Indeed, cocaine users report regular periods of abstinence arising from an inability to afford the purchase of cocaine (Riley [1997] ).
Two studies report estimates of the short run price elasticity of past year cocaine use frequency, 4 which is the most relevant price elasticity for this study because of the use of current prices. Both estimates use cocaine consumption data from the Monitoring the Future (MTF) surveys. Chaloupka et al. [1997] estimate an elasticity of -1.27 for high school seniors in the 1982 and 1989 MTF surveys. Grossman and Chaloupka [1998] obtain a similar estimate of -1.06 for 18 to 27 year-olds from the 1976-85 MTF panels and associated follow-ups using a rational addiction framework in which current cocaine consumption depends on past and future consumption.
A potential argument against the usefulness of these estimates is that the price elasticity for the MTF age group might be higher than that for the relatively older age group that is representative of the criminal population. But estimates of the past year price elasticity of whether or not cocaine is used, termed cocaine participation, from older age groups indicate that any overstatement of the price elasticity is not drastic.
Participation elasticities, which must be smaller in absolute value than corresponding 3 NIJ [1997] discusses accounts from law enforcement officials in Detroit, Indianapolis, and Miami that indicate that the structure of retail cocaine markets in those cities shifted from monopolistic in the early 1980s to highly competitive by the early 1990s. Similarly, though 47 percent of powder cocaine users and 36 percent of crack users in Riley [1997] report buying mainly from one seller, powder and crack cocaine users report knowing an average of 12 and 20 dealers, respectively, from whom they can buy cocaine. 4 Frequency is the closest observed proxy for the actual quantity of the drug consumed. Baumer [1994] shows that arrestee cocaine use is positively 5 Though the studies cited in this subsection use varying sources of data on cocaine consumption, each one imputes cocaine prices with similar methodologies from the same price data that are used in this analysis. These price data, which are also utilized by the studies in the following subsection that examine cocaine prices, are documented in Section V. 6 The studies in this section that analyze crime rates use the same FBI data that are utilized here. These data are documented in Section V. Johnson et al. [1995] similarly finds that most respondents who report violent behavior while using crack were already violent before they started using crack. The sale of crack, though, is strongly associated with violent crime, while among sellers levels of sales and violence are positively related. The authors conclude that crack-related violence is systemic rather than the result of the pharmacological effect of cocaine use.
However, they also report that among women, assaults and property crimes increase with the frequency of crack and cocaine use. Inciardi [1990] summarizes evidence from interviews of 611 Miami youths who reported both significant criminal activity (10 index offenses or 100 lesser crimes) in the past twelve months and at least thrice weekly use of illegal drugs, including cocaine for over 90 percent of the sample, in the previous 90 days. Respondents reported involvement in all three types of drug-related crime. Robbery was the most common, as 59 percent of the sample participated in at least one robbery and the majority of these were for money to purchase drugs. In addition, 5.4 percent reported involvement in violence caused by the pharmacological effect of a drug and 8.3 percent engaged in systemic violence.
Riley [1997] reports evidence from interviews of more than 1,500 arrested cocaine users in six large cities during 1995 and 1996. A substantial fraction report that their main source of income in the month prior to arrest was full-time or part-time work (41 percent) or public assistance (23 percent), while only 4 percent report illegal activity other than drug dealing or prostitution as their primary income source. However, 27 percent of respondents (including about 500 heroin users along with the cocaine users above) were arrested for larceny, burglary or vehicle theft, and 45 percent of those in Manhattan report some illegal income. Benson et. al. [1992] similarly finds that property crime increases with the size of the drug market in Florida counties in 1986 and 1987, holding constant other socioeconomic and deterrence variables and using the ratio of drug convictions to the recidivism rate to proxy for drug market size.
Analogously, 45 percent of callers to a national hotline for cocaine abusers surveyed in 1983 by Washton [1987] report stealing money from their employers, family or friends to support their cocaine habit, and 17 percent said they had lost a job because of cocaine use.
These accounts suggest the possibility that shifts in income composition towards illegal earnings accompany increases in cocaine use. For instance, DeSimone [1998] finds that for respondents in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, reductions in the price of cocaine increase use, which reduces both the likelihood of employment and hours worked by those employed.
Some additional guidance may be provided by evidence on the relationship between heroin and crime. Unlike cocaine, heroin pharmacologically makes users more passive.
Since heroin is similar to cocaine in its illegality and cost, though, legalization proponents Since cocaine demand appears to be more responsive to its own price than is heroin, these results may not extrapolate to cocaine. For instance, DuPont and Greene [1973] present evidence that in Washington, D.C. in the early 1970s, where zealous enforcement efforts were accompanied by an expansion in treatment availability, price increases were associated with declines in both heroin use and reported crime. The implication is that the availability of heroin treatment raises the price elasticity of demand for heroin by providing heroin addicts with a way to prevent withdrawal without having to consume some minimum quantity of the drug.
In sum, estimates of the price elasticity of demand suggest that cocaine price reductions may increase crime, and the use of cocaine appears to be associated with both violent and property crime. The evidence, however, does not delineate a particular causal relationship between cocaine and crime. Moreover, evidence on the effect of cocaine prices on crime is both limited and mixed.
IV. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
I specify a log-linear model for the supply of offense equation (1) that includes fixed effects for cities and years. In particular, for each type of crime under consideration, I
estimate
where for city i in year t, N it is the population, µ i is a fixed city effect, ν t is a fixed year effect, ε it is a random error term, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated including the constant term β C , and the remaining notation is preserved from equation (1). This fixed effects specification eliminates all geographic and temporal forms of heterogeneity that could affect the relationship between cocaine prices and crime.
However, fixed effects do not account for the most important empirical consideration, the possible endogeneity of log P it in equation (2). This may be a concern for several reasons. First, cocaine prices may be a function of the level of crime. An increase in income from crime will increase the demand for cocaine, and thus the price of cocaine, if cocaine is a normal good. Second, various unmeasured factors may affect both cocaine prices and crime. Any unobserved factors that increase illegal activity may increase both cocaine use and non-drug crime at the same time. Similarly, an exogenous shift in cocaine demand that increases the number of users in a city may increase the inherent instability of the cocaine market and thus lead to higher levels of crime. Conversely, an increase in the number of sellers in a city may simultaneously lower prices and raise the incidence of violent territorial disputes. Third, increases in cocaine enforcement efforts may involve the diversion of scarce local police resources away from enforcement against non-drug crime, implying a spurious positive relationship between the price of cocaine and non-drug crime. For instance, Benson and Rasmussen [1991] and Benson et. al. [1992] report that the fraction of arrests that are drug-related is positively related to property crime in Florida counties in 1986 and 1987. 10 OLS estimates of equation (2) are biased if the price is endogenous. This bias is positive for all sources of endogeneity outlined above except the case in which market competition simultaneously lowers prices and increases crime. To alleviate the potential for such bias, I implement a 2SLS procedure to obtain estimates of equation (2). In the first stage, log P it is regressed on all exogenous variables in equation (2) along with an additional set of exogenous variables Z it that influence cocaine prices. This first stage equation is
where for city i in year t, δ i is a fixed city effect, η t is a fixed year effect, ω it is a random error term, and α is the vector of parameters that is estimated. In the second stage, equation (2) is estimated using the predictions of log P it obtained from the estimates of (3) in place of the actual log P it . Both equations are estimated using OLS.
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As is well-known, the excluded instrumental variables Z it must be highly correlated with log P it , as measured by the statistical significance of the estimated α Z , but uncorrelated with ε it , the residual term in (2). The challenge in this fixed effects framework is to find instruments that explain differences across cities in temporal price variations. Caulkins [1995] documents that cocaine prices generally increase with the distance from cities through which cocaine enters the U.S. and decrease with market size.
Meanwhile, Rhodes et al. [1994] indicate that increases in productive efficiency that accompanied profit-induced entry were the main forces behind the steep fall in cocaine prices throughout the 1980s. The implication is that instruments for the price of cocaine should be related to supply factors that capture changes in productive efficiency at the 10 The interpretation of this result as an indication of a direct relationship between drug enforcement and non-drug crime, however, is problematic because drug-related arrests are expected to increase with drug use as well as with drug enforcement intensity. For instance, Rasmussen et. al. [1994] find that both the percentage of arrestees testing positive for drugs and the presence of a state law allowing police to keep a portion of seized assets are significant determinants of the fraction of arrests that are drug-related. In addition, the authors report that cocaine prices in Miami fell by more than 50 percent between 1985 and 1987, while at the state level both property crime and the fraction of arrests that are drug-related increased sharply. This also constitutes anecdotal evidence of a negative relationship between cocaine prices and property crime. 11 The estimated standard errors of the parameters in equation (2) wholesale level or variations in points of import and wholesale distribution. In addition, the price decline that took place during the 1980s occurred despite substantial increases in enforcement activity during that time (Kleiman [1992] ). Consequently, a measure of cocaine-specific enforcement is desirable to determine if cities in which enforcement increased by greater amounts experienced smaller price declines.
V. DATA
The data used here are a panel of 30 large U.S. cities with observations running from 1981 to 1995. The sample is restricted to the cities for which Abt Associates tabulates average annual cocaine prices (Rhodes and Pittayathikhun [1996] ). 12 The sample is appropriate in that large cities are centers of the cocaine trade. In addition, the sample period begins between the initial explosion in powder cocaine use in the 1970s and the introduction of crack in the mid-1980s and ends at the time by which Golub and Johnson [1997] say the crack epidemic was in decline for most of the U.S.
The cocaine price data originate from purchases recorded in the System to Retrieve
Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE) file of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). STRIDE reports prices paid by undercover DEA agents along with other federal agents and some state agents. 13 These prices are expected to be accurate since an unreasonable price offer would make the seller suspicious and put the agent in danger.
Transaction size must be standardized because substantial quantity discounts exist (Caulkins and Padman [1993] ; Rhodes et al. [1994] ). Most purchases of less than one bulk ounce (about 28 grams) are likely to have been made at the retail level (Rhodes and Pittayathikhun [1996] ). The price variable used here, therefore, is the average price per pure gram of cocaine for purchases of one bulk ounce or less.
14 12 These cities, listed in Table AI , are the ones sampled by the Drug Abuse Warning Network, which collects data on drug-related emergency department episodes, and/or the Drug Use Forecasting system, which records the fraction of arrestees testing positive for certain drugs (as mentioned earlier). 13 Though STRIDE includes transactions by agents from over 140 DEA offices, the data is sufficient to allow construction of price series for only the sample cities. In addition, STRIDE contains data dating back to 1973. However, the sample begins in 1981, the year in which STRIDE began denoting whether individual transactions were purchases or seizures, because Abt does not tabulate data from earlier years. 14 All monetary variables are adjusted to 1982-84 values using the CPI for all urban consumers.
For the sample cities, I obtain data from the FBI on annual totals of seven categories of crime: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. Appendix I contains definitions of these crime categories. The FBI statistics include all crimes reported to law enforcement authorities.
For two reasons, these numbers understate true crime for all categories except murder.
First, according to Bureau of Justice Statistics [1996] figures, only 42 percent of violent crimes and 33 percent of property crimes are reported to the police. Second, in a multiple-offense criminal incident, only the most serious offense is counted. For example, if a robber kills the victim in the process of the hold-up, only the murder is recorded.
The two instrumental variables Z it that identify the cocaine price in equation (3) also come from STRIDE. One is the average purity of retail cocaine purchases, which enters (3) in logged form. The specification of the standardized price of cocaine as a function of purity follows that of Rhodes and Pittayathikhun [1996] . Kleiman [1992] and Caulkins [1994] note that wholesale price decreases in the 1980s were passed through to retail markets primarily as purity increases. As an instrument, therefore, purity is considered a summary indicator of supply factors that affect wholesale prices, which are exogenous at the retail level. In addition, Caulkins and Padman [1993] argue that their results, which indicate incomplete quality premiums, suggest that retail dealers cannot freely adjust the purity of their product.
Purity increases with technological innovations in production by cocaine suppliers.
The main innovation during the period under study is the introduction of crack, which occurred when cocaine suppliers invented a safe, inexpensive and easily used process for making smokable cocaine. Since the introduction of crack reduced the unit cost of cocaine intoxication, 15 it is widely considered an exogenous technological innovation (Thornton [1991] ; Kleiman [1992] ; Benson and Rasmussen [1996] ; Grogger and Willis [1998] ). This innovation increased profit opportunities, thereby shifting out supply and causing the price of cocaine to fall. Data on cocaine-related emergency room admissions (Grogger and Willis [1998] ) and arrestee cocaine use (Golub and Johnson [1997] ) imply that the timing of both the rise and decline of crack varied widely across U.S. cities.
Moreover, prices were falling during the time when Grogger and Willis [1998] indicate that the popularity of crack was surging, and conversely were holding relatively steady beginning in 1990, at which time Golub and Johnson [1997] say crack began to decline in many major U.S. cities.
The other variable in Z it is the per capita number of retail cocaine purchases recorded in STRIDE, which also enters (3) in logged form. This variable is expected to reflect DEA enforcement intensity and therefore positively affect cocaine prices.
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An advantage of this measure is that it pertains specifically to retail-level enforcement and therefore should be independent from the purity variable. These instruments thus account for two separate and important supply-side determinants of retail cocaine prices.
For each crime category, the probability of arrest is proxied by the ratio of arrests to reported offenses. Arrest rates are expected to be negatively related to crime since increases in the likelihood of punishment lower the expected gain from criminal activity.
Arrest totals for the seven index crimes are obtained from the FBI. An issue regarding the arrest rate is its potential simultaneity with crime rates, which may arise because offenses are both the dependent variable and the denominator of the arrest rate and because arrest rates may respond to offense rates. The available data is insufficient to explicitly control for the endogeneity of arrest rates while already doing so for the cocaine price. To examine the impact of including the arrest rate, therefore, I simply report an alternative estimate of equation (2) in which arrest rates are excluded from equations (2) and (3).
The two other drugs for which price measures are included are heroin and alcohol.
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These drugs may be substitutes for cocaine in the production of intoxication. Conversely, 15 Since smoking delivers cocaine to the brain more efficiently than snorting, an equivalent high can be achieved from a smaller dose of crack than powder cocaine. 16 The FBI also records drug arrest totals. Rasmussen [1991] and Benson et. al. [1992] use the fraction of total arrests that are for drug violations to control for drug enforcement intensity. I do not use that data here for two reasons. First, drug arrests are likely to be correlated with drug use (see footnote 10). Second, drug arrests are not consistently recorded, and totals are often not partitioned into arrests for specific drug types. 17 Marijuana prices are not included because STRIDE data are inadequate to allow the estimation of average marijuana prices for individual geographic areas. Other state level policy variables, such as Boyum and Kleiman [1995] point out that depressants, particularly alcohol and heroin, are often used with cocaine, a stimulant. Saffer and Chaloupka [1996] report evidence of a complementary relationship between cocaine and both alcohol and heroin in the form of negative cross-price effects, holding own-prices constant, between the three drugs.
Including measures of heroin and alcohol prices, therefore, ensures that the estimated cocaine price effects do not in part reflect indirect effects through heroin or alcohol.
Section III documents the expected link between heroin and crime. The heroin price variable used here is the average price per pure gram of purchases weighing one gram or less, which also comes from Abt tabulations of STRIDE data. These data are insufficient to compute average prices for individual cities, so four regional averages are used. 18 The exogeneity of the heroin price in the context of an estimation strategy designed to address the endogeneity of the cocaine price is questionable. Thus the alternative estimates that exclude arrest rates also exclude the price of heroin. The alcohol price measure is the sum of per gallon state and local taxes on beer, which is used because taxes are the largest individual item in the price of beer (Beer Institute [1995] ) and city-level alcohol prices are not consistently available.
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Alcohol consumption is associated with crime, particularly violence (Pernanen [1991] ; Cook and Moore [1993] ; National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse [1997] ). Since alcohol is legal and inexpensive, any causal relationship between alcohol and crime arises directly from alcohol intoxication. Cook and Moore [1993] and Saffer and Chaloupka [1996] document negative effects of alcohol prices on alcohol consumption. Thus negative effects of the beer tax on crime are expected. Chaloupka and Saffer [1992] find that beer taxes are inversely related to violent crime in a 1975-90 panel of U.S. states. Cook and Moore [1993] likewise report that raising state beer taxes reduces rape and robbery rates in a 1979-88 sample of states.
City-level socioeconomic and demographic variables are formed by aggregating individual observations within each city and year from the Current Population Survey marijuana decriminalization policies and fines and prison sentences for marijuana and cocaine possession, change little over the sample period. 18 The four regions are the northeast, midwest, south and west. Baltimore and Washington D.C. are assigned to the south, Denver is assigned to the west, and regional groupings for remaining cities are as expected. The weight threshold of one gram again conforms to the guidelines set forth by Rhodes and Pittayathikhun [1996] .
(CPS) Annual Earnings File. 20 The economic-related variables included here are the unemployment rate, the percentages of the population that have completed high school and college, the real average weekly earnings of labor force participants, and the percentage of labor force participants with earnings below half of the average for labor force participants. The opportunity cost of criminal activity rises with educational attainment and falls with the unemployment rate. Earnings is assumed to be highly correlated with income, which is not observed in the CPS file. Following Ehrlich [1973] , therefore, both earnings variables are predicted to proxy the expected gain from property crime. Average earnings represents the potential income opportunity for criminals.
Holding earnings constant, meanwhile, earnings inequality reflects both the fraction of the population likely to engage in property crime and the differential between legitimate and illegitimate earnings for potential criminals.
21
Several demographic variables are also included. The percentages of the population aged 16 to 24 and 25 to 34 account for the age groups most likely to engage in criminal activities. The percent black, Hispanic, female and married control for additional demographic variation within each city. Finally, although crime and cocaine enforcement are specified in per capita terms, total population is also entered separately as an explanatory variable because of its expected inverse relationship with the cocaine price.
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Population figures represent July 1 provisional census estimates for each year except 1990, for which the population is taken from the decennial census.
19 A gallon is equivalent to four-ninths of a case, or ten and two-thirds twelve ounce beers. 20 This strategy is employed because the only other source of such data is the decennial census. Model [1993] follows a similar approach using the March Annual Demographic File. The CPS variables are constructed from the population aged 16 and older, as the Annual Earnings File (also known as the Outgoing Rotation Group) includes only this component of the population. Point (1) and the accompanying footnote in Appendix II provide further details on the CPS variables. 21 The specification of the earnings inequality variable follows that of Ehrlich [1973] for income, except that I use average rather than median earnings because the former is much easier to compute in the CPS files. I omit labor force non-participants when computing the earnings variables in an attempt to separate out the impact of varying concentrations of individuals who choose to forego market labor, though results do not differ much when comparable earnings variables averaged over the whole population are used. 22 In addition, following other studies of aggregate crime rates (Ehrlich [1973] ; Lott and Mustard [1997] ), all regressions are weighted by city population. Appendix II provides an explanation for all missing observations. On average, slightly more than one crime is committed per ten individuals annually. About five of every six crimes are property offenses, and half of these are larcenies. As Levitt [1995] notes, crime varies substantially across cities even in per capita terms. The within-city variation over time in crime rates, which is about half as large as the between-city variation, is also sizable. The variation within cities in cocaine prices and purity is double the variation across cities, anomalies that are attributable to the considerable decline in prices over the sample period. Table II gives the results for equation (3), the first stage cocaine price regression.
VI. ESTIMATION RESULTS
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Inter-city differences in price changes are influenced both by cocaine enforcement and technological innovation. These two identifying variables are highly significant and related in the expected direction with the price of cocaine. The F-statistic for the test of their joint significance is quite large. 25 This suggests that there is scope for retail cocaine enforcement to affect retail cocaine prices. The estimated elasticities, however, indicate that purity has a much larger effect on the cocaine price than does the number of DEA cocaine purchases. For instance, a ten percent decline in purity increases the cocaine price by a greater amount than does a doubling of DEA enforcement activity. These results corroborate the anecdotal evidence that because wholesale supply factors overwhelmed increases in enforcement during the 1980s, time series correlations between prices and enforcement levels give the misleading impression that enforcement does not 23 Arrest rates can be greater than one because multiple suspects may be arrested for a single crime and because of lags between the occurrence of a crime and the arrest for that crime (Lott and Mustard [1997] ). This problem is most prevalent for murder and, to a lesser extent, rape and aggravated assault. 24 In reality, a separate estimate of equation (3) exists for each crime category since the arrest rate is crimespecific. Table 3 shows the arrest rate coefficients for each type of crime. Results for the other variables vary little across crime categories. 25 Bound et al. [1995] show that this implies a small sample bias of 1/F, or less than 2 percent, of that of the comparable OLS estimate.
affect the price. The magnitude of the elasticity of price with respect to purity also suggests, as Caulkins and Padman [1993] argue, that purity is exogenous at the retail level. 26 Other results from Table II indicate that prices decrease with population size and increase with earnings, as expected, but that no other variable explains a significant amount of the variation in cocaine prices. Table III shows the arrest rate coefficients for each crime category. If the deterrent effect of increases in the probability of arrest for one type of crime spill over to the cocaine market, then arrest rates will be positively related to cocaine prices. However, this is only true for vehicle theft. The estimated relationship is negative for the remaining categories of crime, and it is significant for robbery, burglary and larceny. This suggests a tradeoff in the allocation of enforcement resources between these crimes and the cocaine trade (Benson and Rasmussen [1991] ; Benson et. al. [1992] ; Friedman [1991] ; Niskanen [1992] ). Increases in enforcement against robbery, burglary and larceny may require resources that would otherwise go towards cocaine enforcement, thus simultaneously increasing arrest rates for these crimes and reducing the price of cocaine.
Table IV presents the 2SLS coefficients of equation (2) along with the results of various specification tests. The first column displays the χ 2 -statistic for the test of the joint hypothesis that the identifying variables Z it are not inappropriately excluded from the supply of offenses equation (2) and are uncorrelated with ε it , the residuals from (2).
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The null hypothesis of instrument validity can only be rejected for aggravated assault, and only at the 10 percent level. The implication is that neither cocaine enforcement nor the supply factors that purity summarizes, including the introduction of crack, directly impact crime rates.
The next two columns provide a comparison of the 2SLS and OLS estimates of the price elasticities of crime. The left column shows the OLS coefficient and the right 26 The purity coefficient is insignificantly different from one, similar to those estimated by Caulkins and Padman [1993] and Caulkins [1994] . The implication is that there is no purity premium. This means that the price depends only on the total quantity of cocaine, suggesting that if retail dealers had complete control over purity they would increase their revenues by further diluting their products. 27 Davidson and MacKinnon [1993] show that this overidentification test statistic is constructed by regressing ε it on the full set of exogenous variables, including the identifying variables Z it . The test statistic is the R 2 from that regression multiplied by the sample size. This quantity has a χ 2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to two, the number of variables in Z it . column gives the result of the Hausman [1978] exogeneity test that formally compares the two coefficients. The bias of OLS is positive for all crime categories except aggravated assault. This is expected from the overidentification test result, since the only reason for a negative bias would be systemic crime that arises directly from competition among wholesale distributors or retail dealers. A possible source of bias is that drug enforcement that raises prices simultaneously diverts enforcement resources away from the prevention of other crimes. But the OLS coefficient for vehicle theft, for which Table   III indicates the arrest rate has a deterrent effect in the cocaine market, also exhibits an upward bias. This suggests the presence of other forms of unobserved heterogeneity, such as demand factors that affect both cocaine use and criminal activity.
The next-to-last column gives the 2SLS estimates for a specification that excludes the two explanatory variables most likely to be endogenous, the arrest rate and the price of heroin. The price elasticity of crime is uniformly more negative in this specification than in the one that includes the full set of explanatory variables, as listed in the last column.
These differences appear to be substantial for all crimes other than murder and vehicle theft. 28 The difficulty is choosing between the two specifications, since the estimates including the arrest rate and the price of heroin are inconsistent if these variables are endogenous, whereas the estimates excluding these variables suffer from omitted variable bias if these variables are indeed exogenous. Since the former specification produces more conservative estimates of the price elasticities of crime, and it seems desirable to include measures of deterrence and the price of an illegal drug for which consumption might be closely related to that of cocaine, these two variables are included in the specification of equation (2) that is discussed throughout the remainder of the paper.
The last column of Table IV presents the 2SLS estimates of the price elasticities of the various crimes for this preferred specification. The crucial finding is that the price 28 The magnitudes of these differences increase, for α A < 0 in equation (3), with the magnitudes of β A (which Tables V and VI indicate is negative for all crime categories) and β H (where H is the price of heroin) in equation (2). For instance, when the arrest rate is excluded but the price of heroin is included, the price elasticities of crime are virtually identical to those in the specification in which both the arrest rate and heroin price are excluded except for the two crimes, rape and aggravated assault, in which β H is positive and significant. In these cases, the price elasticities of crime (and their standard errors) are -.176 (.058) and -.085 (.071), respectively. Thus, the large differences in the estimated price elasticities of robbery, burglary, and larceny between the last two columns of Table IV arise primarily from excluding the arrest rate.
elasticity of crime is uniformly negative, and is significant for all categories except aggravated assault. The magnitudes of the price elasticities vary across crime categories, ranging from -0.07 for larceny to -0.27 for motor vehicle theft. 29 The implication is that price changes resulting from exogenous shifts in supply have an impact on both violent and property crime.
The estimated price elasticities of crime show that cocaine prices increased crime substantially during the 1980s. For example, the average price in the sample fell from Another way to assess the results is to compare the estimated price elasticities of the different crimes. This exercise yields several inferences based on the theoretical arguments presented earlier. 30 The first is that demand is price elastic, since all estimated elasticities of crime are negative. All three mechanisms hypothesized in section II through which cocaine prices impact crime require price elastic demand to produce a negative relationship between prices and crime. This supports the recent evidence on the price elasticity of cocaine demand reviewed earlier.
The second inference is that systemic crime is important. Murder has the highest price elasticity, and murder is the crime for which systemic offenses are most likely to be reported to the police. The large negative price elasticity of murder is consistent with the popular perception (Nadelmann [1988] ) and evidence from Grogger and Willis [1998] that the upswing in urban murder rates in the 1980s was attributable in part to an increase in drug-dealer killings. The fact that systemic crime works through price movements 29 Since a substantial fraction of these crimes is not related to cocaine, actual price elasticities of cocainerelated crime are much greater. For example, the arrestee numbers cited in the introduction indicate that about 40 percent of crime in large cities involves cocaine (though this percentage varies across cities and years). Thus the effective elasticity of cocaine-related crime is between -0.17 and -0.68. Even less than 40 percent of crime is cocaine-related, implying even larger price elasticities of cocaine-related crime, if the amount of crime unrelated to cocaine by those testing positive exceeds the amount of cocaine-related crime by those testing negative, and/or cocaine-involved criminals are more likely to be caught than others. 30 These are not intended to represent definitive conclusions of this analysis, as there is no way to substantiate them with these data.
implies that as prices fell, demand increased, which created the need for more dealers.
The resulting increased market competition gave rise to violence.
The third inference is that the negative price elasticities of property crime either reflect cocaine-induced shifts from legal to illegal sources of income or are related to the impact of price changes on cocaine expenditures. 31 This is consistent with robbery having a larger price elasticity of crime than rape or assault, since robbery has both violent and property crime components. 32 This would also help to explain the large price elasticity of murder as partially arising from robberies that escalate to murder.
Fourth, the possibility that the pharmacological effect of cocaine increases crime cannot be eliminated. For instance, the price elasticity of rape is negative and significant.
However, rape is not expected to be arise from systemic effects of cocaine markets and is not an income-producing crime that is conducted to get money to buy cocaine. This would imply that cocaine intoxication increases the likelihood of rape. Cocaine intoxication may also contribute to the negative price elasticities of the other types of crime.
The only insignificant effect of the cocaine price is on aggravated assault. Many factors might contribute to this result. First, systemic-related assaults are likely only reported to the police when medical treatment is required. Second, crimes that are primarily beatings but result in the perpetrator taking the wallet of the victim are reported as robberies (Grogger and Willis [1998] ). Also, the nature of the cocaine trade makes it advisable for dealers to arm themselves (Kleiman [1992] ), which makes it more likely that disputes that would have been assaults instead turn deadly.
Tables V and VI present the remaining results for the individual violent and property crime categories, respectively. 33 Arrest rates have a consistent negative effect on all 31 Although most analysts of systemic crime have focused on violence (Goldstein [1985] ) or assumed that property crime is related only to cocaine demand (Grogger and Willis [1998] ), it is also conceivable that the usual assumption that property crime is not related to systemic factors is wrong. 32 In addition, Baumer [1994] suggests several possible reasons for which price elasticities of robbery and vehicle theft might be larger than those of burglary and larceny, including differences in profitability, liquidity of stolen items, and ease of performing at night and in run-down neighborhoods. 33 For all crime categories, city-specific and year-specific fixed effects are each jointly significant at the 0.01 level. For the city effects, Hausman [1978] tests reject the consistency of a random effects specification for all crime categories except rape and aggravated assault. In these cases, as the test result implies, the estimated fixed and random effects price elasticities are virtually identical. City effects may categories of crime. Criminals thus appear to respond to changes in their expected punishment. At the sample means for the arrest rates, the elasticities of the crime rates with respect to the arrest rate are -0.48 for robbery and burglary, -0.44 for larceny, -0.28 for rape, -0.16 for murder, and -0.12 for aggravated assault and vehicle theft. 34 To the extent that murder and assault are more likely to arise from fits of rage than the other crimes, and that property crimes other than motor vehicle theft require some degree of planning, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that arrest rates are more likely to deter crimes in which criminals have an opportunity to consider the expected penalty from their actions.
The prices of heroin and alcohol each affect some types of crime. Rates of rape and aggravated assault increase with heroin prices, suggesting the presence of systemic violence related to heroin markets. Meanwhile, rates of aggravated assault, larceny, and vehicle theft vary inversely with the beer tax, which presumably reflects a positive effect of alcohol consumption on these types of crime. The only sense in which these results are unexpected is because heroin is expected to impact property crime more than violent crime, while the reverse is true for alcohol.
In general, the effects of economic and demographic factors on crime rates are limited.
Increases in educational attainment reduce murder and rape, increase aggravated assault, and do not affect property crime. Results for earnings suggest that criminals substitute larceny for aggravated assault as the return to property crime increases, 35 though earnings are not related to other types of property crime and are positively related to the murder rate. Income inequality does not have the expected positive relationship with property crime but rather is negatively related to rape and vehicle theft. The results for the unemployment rate imply a shift from aggravated assault to property crime as the reflect systematic differences in the recording of crimes and therefore are not reported. The year effects show that controlling for changes in observable factors, crime generally declined until 1984, rose through 1990 to reach 1981 levels, and fell thereafter almost to 1984 levels. 34 These are substantially larger than the elasticities reported by Lott and Mustard [1997] for their full sample of U.S. counties. Results from their separate regressions on high-crime and low-crime counties show that the difference in samples may at least partially account for this discrepancy. They estimate that arrest rate coefficients are from two to ten times larger in high-crime counties than in low-crime counties, which is the range of the difference between their results and the ones obtained here. 35 Earnings may also be correlated with property values, which Benson et al. [1992] find are positively related to property crime while holding wages constant. The primary conclusion of this analysis is that in the current regime of cocaine illegality, restrictive cocaine policy that raises the price of cocaine will reduce crime. It appears that crime is not a harmful externality of drug enforcement policy that must be accepted in order to receive the benefits of lower cocaine consumption. Rather, crime responses to cocaine price increases appear to represent an additional gain from drug enforcement. This finding provides more evidence that cocaine demand is responsive to its price. Furthermore, since the results imply a causal relationship between cocaine use and crime, programs aimed to reduce cocaine demand should also decrease crime. These include enforcement efforts that increase the search times of buyers, educational campaigns that discourage the initiation of use, and treatment programs that help current users quit.
36 Lott and Mustard [1997] also find that increases in population significantly decrease all types of crime except aggravated assault and vehicle theft. 37 The results for blacks contrast with findings that most types of crime rise with the concentration of blacks in studies such as Benson et. al. [1992] and Grogger and Willis [1998] that do not control for fixed city effects, but agree with those of Levitt [1995] who also controls for city effects. 38 Grogger and Willis [1998] obtain similar results for the fraction of males aged 16 to 24, except that burglary is one of only two crime categories on which the concentration of young males has a positive effect. Lott and Mustard [1997] argue that those vulnerable to crime become more likely to take actions to protect themselves as the concentration of a group that poses a large criminal threat increases, thus yielding an insignificant estimate of the concentration of that group on crime.
These results are consistent with the conventional wisdom, along with evidence from Grogger and Willis [1998] , that the introduction of crack in the mid-1980s raised violent crime rates. But this study goes one step further in showing that any increase in violence resulting from the introduction of crack occurred through its effect on the price of cocaine. Technological innovations such as crack increased violence because the resulting market competition lowered the price of cocaine and increased cocaine demand, not because of a direct impact of market competition on violence. These results also imply that the introduction of crack increased property crime by magnitudes comparable to those of the increases in violent crime.
A limitation of this study is that the cities analyzed here are a small subset of U.S.
cities specifically selected because of their size. These cities are important because their residents make up one-eighth of the U.S. population. However, crime rates are much higher in the large cities analyzed here than in less populated areas. Likewise, cocaine use is more prevalent inside central cities than outside them. The results obtained here, therefore, may not generalize to smaller cities, suburbs and rural areas.
It is also inappropriate to extend the implications of this study beyond making a policy prescription within the existing system of drug prohibition. In particular, the present analysis cannot adequately address whether the prohibition of cocaine creates crime.
Legalization would eliminate systemic violence 39 but would simultaneously increase violence arising from cocaine intoxication by substantially lowering prices. The impact on property crime is likewise uncertain. The price elasticity of demand is expected to fall as the price declines, since the impact of a given percentage change in price on the budget is smaller at lower prices. Conversely, the estimates obtained here reflect the short-run price elasticity of demand, whereas for an addictive drug like cocaine the long-run elasticity of demand, and therefore of crime, may be considerably higher. 40 In addition, legalization would seemingly shift the cocaine demand function outward.
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Without observable variation in legal status, it is impossible to fully identify the causal mechanisms linking cocaine prices to crime. Nonetheless, as Boyum and Kleiman [1994, 303] remark, "For policy purposes, it is often sufficient to know whether depressing the brake or accelerator makes the car go slower or faster. Arguing about why can sometimes distract us from learning how to drive." The main policy implication of this analysis, that enforcement that increases the price of cocaine will lower crime as long as cocaine is illegal, does not depend on the exact structural relationship between the price and crime.
In light of the limited likelihood of legalizing cocaine in the near future, this implication remains highly relevant for U.S. illegal drug policy. 40 For instance, Grossman and Chaloupka [1998] estimate that their previously cited short-run price elasticity of -1.06 corresponds to a long-run elasticity of -1.85. 41 Friedman [1991] , though, argues that demand would actually shift inward because of the loss of any psychic benefit from participating in an illegal activity.
APPENDIX I
Definitions of Offense Categories
Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter: The willful killing of one human being by another. Deaths caused by negligence, attempts or assaults to kill, suicides, accidental deaths and justifiable homicides (the killing of a felon by a law enforcement officer in the line of duty or by a private citizen during the commission of a felony) are excluded.
Forcible rape: The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. Rapes by force and attempts or assaults to rapes are included, while statutory offenses (no force used--victim under age of consent) are excluded.
Aggravated assault: An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury, usually accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Simple assaults are excluded.
Robbery:
The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear.
Burglary:
The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft, including attempted forcible entry.
Larceny:
The unlawful taking of property from the possession of another, including thefts of bicycles or automobile accessories, shoplifting, pocket-picking, the stealing of any property or article which is not taken by force and violence or by fraud, and attempted larcenies, but excluding embezzlement, "con" games, forgery, worthless checks, etc.
Motor vehicle theft:
The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle. Motorboats, airplanes, and construction or farming equipment are excluded.
APPENDIX II
Explanation of Missing Observations
The data are a panel of 30 large U.S. cities from 1981-1995 for which Abt has tabulated average cocaine prices. The cities and years included in the sample are listed in Birmingham -82, 1988 Cleveland 1993; Indianapolis 1992; Los Angeles 1995; Miami 1981 Miami , 1984 Omaha 1989 Omaha , 1990 Omaha , 1994 Phoenix 1994; Portland 1981-82; San Jose 1981 -82, 1984 (b) following Caulkins [1994] , 21 additional price observations are dropped because the average is computed from fewer than five transactions:
44 Birmingham 1986 Birmingham , 1991 Cleveland 1982; Houston 1982 Houston , 1993 Los Angeles 1994; 42 Some observations are missing for multiple reasons, but once a reason is provided for a missing observation, that observation is excluded from subsequent categories that may also apply. 43 Several points regarding the CPS data should be made here. First, to be consistent with the crime and arrest data, only CPS observations from individuals living in central cities are used to compute the demographic variables. Second, the two exclusions in (b) result from an error in the central city status variable in the version of the CPS that I obtained from NBER that forces me to calculate demographic variables for 1995 from only the first five months of the CPS. Third, because of the way metropolitan areas were identified in the CPS before 1986, Kansas City includes only the Missouri portion of the city, and Minneapolis and St. Paul are combined, for all variables in all years. Finally, the demographic variables for San Francisco are computed from CPS data from both San Francisco and Oakland from 1981-85 because the two cities are not separately identified, but these five years of observations are included in the sample because their removal has no effect on the results. 44 This restriction has little impact on the magnitude of the estimated price elasticities of crime and no impact on their significance levels. 
TABLE I Summary Statistics
Crime rates and cocaine purchases are per 100,000 residents. The between standard deviation measures variation across city means, while the within represents the deviation of individual values from city-specific means.
The sample size is 377 for all variables except crime and arrest rates for murder (n=376), rape (n=366), robbery 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average price of cocaine. Fixed effects for cities and years are also included. The reference observation is Washington in 1981.
The p-value is given in parentheses next to the F-statistic. Significance levels of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. This is the first stage regression for the aggravated assault rate equation and thus includes the arrest rate for aggravated assault. Table III shows the arrest rate coefficients for all first stage equations.
Results for other variables vary little across the different first stage equations.
TABLE III Effects of Arrest Rates on the Price of Cocaine ----------------------------------------------------------------
Coeff.
Std. Error  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------Note:
The left column indicates the crime category to which the arrest rate applies.
The dependent variable in each case is the logarithm of the average price of cocaine. The full set of explanatory variables listed in Table II and fixed effects for cities and years are included in all regressions. Significance levels of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. -------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE IV Estimates of Crime Equations ------------------------------------------------------------------------------Coefficients --------------
----------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the per capita crime rate for the category indicated in the left column.
The full set of explanatory variables listed in Table V and fixed effects for cities and years are included in all regressions except for the column "2SLS w/o (D,A)" which excludes the arrest rate and the price of heroin. Standard errors are given in parentheses beneath coefficients and p-values are given in parentheses beneath χ 2 -statistics, which have two degrees of freedom corresponding to the two excluded instruments. Significance levels of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. Complete results for the specification in the last column are displayed in Tables V and VI.
TABLE V 2SLS Estimates of Violent Crime Equations ----------------------------------------------------------------
Murder Rape Agg. Robbery Assault  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Note: For all regressions, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the per capita crime rate, fixed effects for cities and years are included, and the reference observation is Washington in 1981. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
TABLE VI 2SLS Estimates of Property Crime Equations ----------------------------------------------------------------
Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------
